B. Sound: Tree In The Forest
[3:19] Another example of an indefinable subjective experience is that of sound as illustrated by the famous tree in the forest analogy presented by Bishop Berkeley (1685-1753).
[3:20] Question: If a tree falls in a forest and there are no perceivers around to hear it, would it make any sound?
[3:21] Answer: If sound is defined as airwaves then certainly there is sound present when the tree falls. If sound is defined as the experience a person has after their eardrums have been stimulated creating electrical impulses that stimulate the neurons in the brain creating a subjective cognitive experience of sound (say “CRACK!”) then of course there is no sound in the forest if there are no cognitive perceivers there to experience the sound of the tree falling, as the sound referred to here is the mental experience.
[3:22] However, the naïve realist will incorrectly think that the subjective cognitive experience of sound, is a factual objective reality and therefore falsely conclude that if a tree falls in the forest and there is no perceiver to perceive it that the subjective cognitive experience of sound would still be present, i.e., the naturalistic fallacy.
[3:23] Notice that the issue has nothing to do with the skepticism of sound existing or the determining of how a person would know whether or not there was sound existing, rather the issue is the distinction between the primary qualities that cause the sense data, (the air waves), and the secondary qualities, (the subjective cognitive experiences caused by the sense data). Since secondary qualities only exists as experiences of perceivers and if there are no perceivers in the forest, then of course it would be impossible for experiential sound to be present as a secondary quality.
[3:24] To make the point even more clear, the physical world independent of perceivers is a silent world, and what most people define as “sound” is actually only the “experience of sound” that only occurs in minds as subjective cognitive experiences. The world independent of experiencers is obviously experientially silent and experientially colorless, and the experiences of perceiving beings is often times noisy and colorful.
[3:25] It is also the case that the subjective cognitive experiences (secondary qualities) have very little resemblance, if any at all, to the air pressure waves that cause the sense data by moving the perceiver’s ear drums that then creates electrical impulses that stimulates the neurons in their brains which then create the subjective indefinable cognitive experience of “sound.”
C. All Sense Data
[3:26] Like color and sound, the subjective cognitive experiences of taste, smell, touch, and all other sense data experiences, are all secondary qualities. Primary qualities are defined to be the first link of causation that ultimately results in the experience of secondary qualities in the mind.
[3:27] Whether a person can gain knowledge of primary qualities through the use of secondary qualities is another very interesting epistemological question. It can be argued that those qualities that can be described mathematically, i.e., that are not sense dependent, are those qualities that are in fact primary. But mathematics is certainly not the nature of primary qualities, as the Pythagorians believed, rather mathematics is currently understood to be a language of representation, or thought processes, that has been constructed to help people understand more logically and systematically the “nature of reality,” and/or logical relationships. However, since mathematic’s is composed of analytical statements it can be argued that mathematics are simply equations or restatements of its own mathematical reality or worldview. Moral principles might also be much like mathematics, an analytic language of equations that simply restate in different words the moral reality or worldview of the agent and/or society.
1. Solipsistic states
[3:28] If the only experience a perceiver is capable of having are secondary qualities, then it follows that it would be impossible for perceivers to experience a primary quality, as all experiences are by definition secondary qualities.
[3:29] Descartes, using the process of methodological doubt, doubted the existence of everything that was doubtable. All secondary qualities such as sight, hearing, touch, smell, and taste, are all doubtable. Even being awake is doubtable as everything could be a dream. However, when doubting one’s own existence, that oddly ended up being an affirmation of existence as a doubting being. Existence as a thinking substance ended up being an indubitable truth. That is how Descartes came up with his famous aphorism: “I think therefore I am.” The difficulty was getting out of this solipsistic state, i.e., isolated within their own subjective cognitive experiences.
[3:30] But don’t people in fact “know” some primary qualities with regard to the world around them without having any sense data of such experiences, as for example, protons, neutrons, and electrons? However, if they “know” that “knowing” by definition is a secondary quality.
[3:31] In other words, the primary and secondary quality distinctions have the potential of leaving the individual in a solipsistic state. If so then morality may also have the potential of ending up being a solipsistic state.
a. Rational arguments against solipsism
[3:32] Three rational arguments for the existence of not only the solipsistic “thinking substance” but the external world as well.
1) A person cannot experience another’s experiences
[3:33] If all a person can know are their own experiences, yet at the same time they cannot know what it is like to be a bat, cat, or fish, then it seems rational to think that those external entities must in fact exist independently of their thoughts, otherwise they would be able to know what it was a like to be a bat, cat or fish.
2) Languages are communal
[3:34] Languages, at least those that are written or verbal, are not private as they are ways of communicating to others, not just to oneself. Since a person cannot control what other’s communicate to them, and since individuals must learn the vocabulary and how to communicate with the vocabulary, it is rational to conclude that individuals in communicating communities are not alone.
3) Most perceptions are determined
[3:35] The fact that people are determined in their perception of sense data, such as “green grass,” is evidence that something external must be the cause of the impressions, e.g., a person cannot will to see “pink grass” and then perceive “green” as “pink.” Therefore it is rational to conclude that there is an external cause of the determined perceptions.
b. Empirical arguments against solipsism
[3:36] Three empirical arguments for the existence of not only the solipsistic “thinking substance” but the external world as well.
1) Empiricism proves existence not nonexistence
[3:37] Empirically a person cannot prove that something does not exist. Rather evidence can only “give evidence” for existence. Since there are numerous examples of evidence for existence and none for nonexistence the following truism must be the case: existence must exist.
2) Technology interacts with the environment
[3:38] Technology is a means for interacting with the surrounding environment. Without the surrounding environment there would be no technology. There is technology. Therefore the external environment must exist.
3) Natural selection necessitates existence
[3:39] Natural selection is the ultimate empirical evidence of existence. Since all sciences converge on the principles of evolution and natural selection, and since natural selection works on the basis of existence reproducing into other existences while adapting to the changing environments, then it follows that there is the existence of an external reality.
2. Dualistic worldviews are a misperception
[3:40] Another serious issue related to the making of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities is the dualistic worldview that it tends to create. From this point of view there seems to be primary qualities that are in the physical world of causation, and then there are the secondary qualities that are in the mental world of experience.
[3:41] This dualism may be helpful for discussion and understanding, but it also may be incorrect to separate out the physical world from the mental world if reality is in fact holistic.
[3:42] Holistically a subjective cognitive experience cannot be independent of the physical world because in order to have a subjective cognitive experience there is the necessary condition of having a physical brain with neurons.
[3:43] Since this is the case, then the dualistic divisions that seem to arise because of the primary and secondary distinction is ultimately a misperception, even if it was helpful for cognitive analysis.
[3:44] It is also interesting to note that although the mental world of experience, such as personal identity or morality is totally dependent on the existence of the physical world, i.e. the brain, it is also true that the “physical world” of the universe has no dependence for its existence on the mental world of experience.
[3:45] The divisions related to primary and secondary qualities certainly seems to be helpful in understanding the type of metaphysical existence, or nature of reality, of the experiential world of morality, yet it still must be realized that helpful tools, or conceptions of reality, may not be the complete or correct picture of reality.
SUMMARY: Primary Qualities & Secondary Qualities
[3:46] Metaphysically primary qualities are that which exist even if they are not perceived, and secondary qualities are that which exist only if they are perceived, such as color, taste, touch, sound, and smell.
[3:47] A naïve realist is a person that holds to the belief that secondary qualities are primary qualities. A sophisticated realist is a person who recognizes that there is a distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Both are called realists because they are making metaphysical claims for existence.
[3:48] Several issues arise because of the primary secondary qualities distinction. Three of them are as follows:
1. Idealism
[3:49] Epistemologically, only secondary qualities can be known. If all knowledge is cognitive then all knowledge, is by definition secondary qualities. Therefore it is impossible to come to any knowledge of primary qualities that are independent of secondary qualities. It is not only possible that cognitive experiences could have little if any resemblance at all to the causation of such experiences, but it is also the case that there is no evidence that primary qualities even exist because all experiences are by definition secondary qualities. Idealism is the position that the only knowledge that can be known are secondary qualities.
2. Solipsism
[3:50] Epistemologically, the only experiences that cognitive beings can have are their own subjective experiences—secondary qualities, and therefore the self, is all that a thinking being can know. For humans, this is certainly a type of epistemological anthropocentrism in which all knowledge can in fact only be from the human subject’s perspective. Since it is impossible to have any experiences other than what the self experiences, it follows that there is no evidence that can establish anything other than the metaphysical existence of the self. Descartes’ “I think therefore I am” exemplifies this because if a person affirms their existence then they exist, and even if they deny their existence the very activity of denying is an affirmation of their existence at least as a thinking being. However, this still leaves the “thinking substance” in a solipsistic state.
a. Three rational arguments against solipsism
1) Persons cannot experience another’s experiences.
[3:51] If all that a person can know are their own experiences, yet at the same time they cannot know what it is like to be a bat, cat, or fish, then it seems rational to think that those external entities must in fact exist independently of their thoughts, otherwise they would be able to know what it was a like to be a bat, cat or fish.
2) Languages are communal.
[3:52] Languages, at least those that are written or verbal, are not private as they are ways of communicating to others, not just to oneself. Since a person cannot control what other’s communicate to them, and since individuals must learn the vocabulary and how to communicate with the vocabulary, it is rational to conclude that individuals in communities are not alone.
3) Most Perceptions are determined.
[3:53] The fact that people are determined in their perception of sense data, such as “green grass,” is evidence that something external must be the cause of their impressions. Therefore it is rational to conclude that there is an external cause of the determined perceptions.
b. Three empirical arguments against solipsism
1) Empiricism proves existence not nonexistence.
[3:54] Empirically a person cannot prove that something does not exist as the evidence of a nonexistent something would obviously not exist. Rather evidence can only “give evidence” for existence. Since there are numerous examples of evidence for existence and none for nonexistence the following truism must be the case: existence must exist.
2) Technology interacts with the environment.
[3:55] Technology is a means for interacting with the surrounding environment. Without the surrounding environment there would be no technology. There is technology. Therefore the external environment must exist.
3) Natural selection necessitates existence.
[3:56] Natural selection is the ultimate rational evidence of existence. Since all sciences converge on the principles of evolution and natural selection, and since natural selection works on the basis of existence reproducing into other existences while adapting to the ever changing environments, then it follows that there is the existence of an external reality.
3. Dualism
[3:57] Metaphysically there seems to be a mind-body dualism that is created or implied when using the primary and secondary quality distinction. Dualistically the non-cognitive physical world can exist independently of the mind, however, holistically the mind is totally dependent on the physical world of the brain as cognition cannot occur without physical neurons and their activities. This dualistic distinction is a position that has been recognized and presented since Democritus, 2500 years ago, to the present.
[3:58] Please take: E&M Quiz 4a